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CIVIL RIGHTS-WORK ENVIRONMENT; SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
"SEXUAL HARASSMENT BY A SUPERVISOR OF THE SAME SEX,
IS IT ACTIONABLE?"
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Walden Book Co.,
885 F. Supp. 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995)
I. FACTS
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [hereinafter
EEOC] filed a complaint on December 23, 1993, on behalf of employee,
William Newberry, against the Defendant, Walden Book Company.I
Plaintiff alleged that Newberry was harassed2 while employed at Walden
Book Company by his immediate supervisor, Perry Porch, a homo-
sexual .3
In January of 1995, the Defendant filed a motion requesting
judgment on pleadings 4 to determine the issue of whether same-sex
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.5 The District Court denied Defendant's motion, holding that
same-sex sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII.6
II. LEGAL HISTORY
A. TITLE VII AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Title VII prohibits employment discrimination against any individu-
al with respect to his or her compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment, due to the individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.7 Title VII specifically applies to employers, their agents,
I. Brief for Plaintiff-Intervenor at 2, EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1100 (M.D.
Tenn. 1995) (No. 3-93-1050).
2. Telephone Interview with Katharine Kores, Supervising Trial Attorney, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Memphis, Tenn. (Aug. 25, 1995). Examples of the harassment which Porch
subjected the plaintiff to included: keeping him after work; inviting him to office parties; exposing him
to pictures of homosexual men: inquiring whether plaintiff's nipples were pierced: and pulling him
down into lap of Porch. Id.
3. EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1100 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
4. Brief for Plaintiff-Intervenor at 2, Walden (No. 3-93-1050). Defendant in lieu of motion on
pleadings could have filed a motion for summary judgment as the EEOC's complaint stated a generic
form of sexual harassment which clearly stated a claim under Title VII. Id.
5. Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1100. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is federal statutory law
which bars discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2 (1988).
6. Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1104.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Ironically, sex as a basis of discrimination was added as a floor
amendment as a last minute effort to undermine the adoption of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Meritor
Say. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1986) (citing 110 CONrG. REC. 2577-2584 (1964)); see also
Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1081, 1085 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that adding the word "sex"
to the legislation was an attempt to thwart the adoption of the Civil Rights Act). An argument was
made against adding the word "sex" to the Civil Rights Act, as "sex discrimination" is unlike other
types of discrimination to justify separate legislation. The argument failed and the bill quickly passed:
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employment agencies, or labor organizations, 8 and protects male and
female employees equally. 9 The employer may be held responsible for
the acts of sexual harassment of fellow employees where the employer or
its agent knows or should have known of the conduct, unless the em-
ployer takes immediate and appropriate corrective action.10
Sexual harassment claims originated out of the passage of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, now commonly known as Title VII.lI However,
courts did not immediately view sexual harassment as discrimination
under Title VII.12 Initially, sex discrimination cases dealt with the
disparate treatment of one sex in terms of hiring, firing, promotion,
wages, and other tangible benefits.13 It was not until the mid-1970's that
a court held that sexual harassment of an employee by a supervisor
violates Title VII. 14 A decade later, the United States Supreme Court in
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,15 confirmed that sexual harassment
violates Title VII.16
However, Meritor did not resolve all sexual harassment issues. 17 In
Meritor, a female employee had been harassed by a male supervisorl 8
and consequently courts generally interpret sexual harassment claims to
be actionable where male supervisors harass female workers.19 In
consequently, there is little legislative discussion on sex discrimination. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 63-64
(referring to comments made by Rep. Celler and Rep. Green, 110 CONG. REC. 2577, 2584).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2; 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (c) (1995).
9. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64 (stating that congressional intent was to eliminate differential
treatment of men and women).
10. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (stating that where the employer knew or should have known of
conduct of non-employees, and failed to take immediate corrective action, liability may also exist); see
also Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72 (stating that the Supreme Court declines to issue a definitive ruling on
employer liability).
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII § 703, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)).
12. See, e.g., Come v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated. 562 F.2d
55 (9th Cir. 1977) (declining to apply Title VII relief to a sexual harassment claim).
13. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds sub
nor. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that a supervisor's retaliation against an
employee because she had refused his sexual advances violated Title VII).
15. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
16. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (finding both quid pro quo and hostile
work environment claims are actionable).
17. Meritor did not discuss sexual harassment claims made by victims who are homosexuals,.
transsexuals, and transvestites, and courts generally do not recognize such claims as being based on
sex. See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748, 750 (8th Cir. 1982) (declaring that Title
VII does not encompass discrimination against transsexuals); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel. Co., 608 F.2d
327, 329-30 (9th Cir. 1979) (showing that courts have refused to extend Title VII protection to
homosexuality for harassment based on the homosexuality). Holloway v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 566
F.2d 659, 662-63 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that transsexuals and transvestites are not protected from
discrimination under Title VII).
18. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
19. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l Co., 50 F.3d 428,430 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that in concept,
women should be protected from sexual harassment which creates a "hellish" work environment for
women).
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addition, courts have extended Meritor to include sexual harassment of
"reverse discrimination" of males by females. 20  However, whether an
action can be maintained under Title VII where the harasser is the same
sex as the victim remains in flux.21
B. TYPES OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Interpretation of Title VII as it pertains to sex discrimination claims
has evolved into two main types of sexual harassment: 22 quid pro quo
and hostile or abusive work environment discrimination.
23
Under the quid pro quo theory, the plaintiff must show a loss of
tangible economic benefits linked to his or her refusal to comply with a
supervisor's sexual demands. 24 Quid pro quo harassment may arise
from conduct of a single incident.
25
Hostile or abusive work environment discrimination is defined as a
type of harassment that does not affect an economic aspect of the
plaintiff's employment, but instead deprives the employee of working in
an environment which is free from intimidation, ridicule, and insult.
26
In order to bring a claim under either theory, a plaintiff must first
prove a prima facie case of sex discrimination. 27 The concept of prima
20. See id. (stating, in dicta, that sexual harassment of women by men may be more common, but
harassment of men by women, men by men, and women by women should also be actionable in
appropriate cases); see also Jensen v. Board of County Comm'rs, 636 F. Supp. 293, 299 (D. Kan.
1986).
21. See, e.g., Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that
same-sex harassment by a co-worker or supervisor provides no cause of action under Title VII);
Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (holding same-sex harassment by a
co-worker does not state a claim under Title VII). Contra Joyner v. AAA Cooper Trans., 597 F. Supp.
537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983) affd mem., 749 F.2d 732 (1 1th Cir. 1984) (finding that a plaintiff had
proven a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment by a supervisor of a manager); Wright
v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 310 (N.D. 111. 1981) (holding that discharge for
rejecting homosexual advances by a supervisor of the same-sex is a violation of Title VII).
22. Kathryn R. McKinley, Note, Changing Our Perspective: Should Washington Adopt The
Reasonable Victim Standard of Viewing Hostile Environment Claims?. 30 GONZ. L. REV. 315, 3 19-22
(1994-95) (comparing hostile work environment and quid pro quo sexual harassment claims).
23. Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 541-42 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir.
1982)).
24. See, e.g., id. at 542 (stating an employee must show a loss of tangible job benefits due to
refusal to succumb to a supervisor's sexual demands).
25. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 481 U.S. 1041
(1987).
26. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); see also Rabidue. 805 F.2d at 620
(showing that as opposed to a quid pro quo claim, which requires only a single incident of harassment,
sexually hostile or intimidating environments are created by multiple exposures to offensive conduct).
Hostile or abusive work environment discrimination was first recognized by the Court of Appeals of
the District of Columbia as actionable under Title VII in 1981. Bundy v. Jackson. 641 F.2d 934.
943-44 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In 1986, in a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court recognized the claim
and held that sex based discrimination which creates a hostile or abusive working environment
constitutes a violation of Title VII. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73.
27. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792. 802 (1973) (stating that the plaintiff
must prove a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
facie case means the plaintiff must initially produce adequate evidence to
insure a favorable ruling on a motion for directed verdict or a motion to
dismiss.28 Although elements for a prima facie case are similar for both
quid pro quo and hostile work environment, they vary slightly and these
variances have had a significant impact in the success of same-sex claims
under each respectively.29
1. Quid Pro Quo Harassment
In order to prove a quid pro quo prima facie case, the plaintiff must
show five elements: (1) the employee was part of a protected class; (2)
the employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual advances or requests
for sexual favors; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) submission of
the employee to the unwelcome advances or the employee's refusal to
submit to the supervisor's sexual demands was an express or implied
condition for receiving job benefits or resulted in a tangible job detri-
ment; and (5) employer liability. 30
The first element is a person must be a member of a protected
class.31 Because "sex" is a protected category, in almost all cases this
element requires only that the employee be either male or female. 32
The second element, unwelcome sexual harassment, is often disput-
ed.33 Defendants have argued that if a petitioner voluntarily engages in
sex-related conduct it should not be considered unwelcome. 34 However,
in Meritor, the Supreme Court resolved this issue by stating that volun-
tary engagement in sex-related conduct is not a defense to a sexual
harassment claim. 35 The Court in Meritor concluded the real question is
whether the victim's conduct indicated that the sexual advances were
28. BLACK'S LAW DicTiONARY 1189-90 (6th ed. 1991). The plaintiff has the burden of proving a
prima facie case by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
29. See Debra L. Raskin, Sexual Harassment in Employment, C108 A.L.I. A.B.A. 141, 147, 160
(1995).
30. Id. at 143 (citing Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat'l Management Co.. 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.
1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (11 th Cir. 1982); and other courts with similar
tests) (citations omitted).
31. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,909 (11 th Cir. 1982).
32. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903; see also Raskin, supra note 29, at 150 (referring to Prescott v.
Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1549 n.2 (M.D. Ala. 1995), which stated that
it appears that a party need only to be male or female to be protected). An exception is found where a
male alleged an injury from an environment which was sexually hostile to his female supervisors, and
that male was found not to be part of a protected group. Raskin, supra note 29, at 150 (citation
omitted).
33. Raskin, supra note 29, at 144.
34. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67-69 (1986) (referring to the lower court's
findings).
35. Id. at 68.
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unwelcome. 36 This question must ultimately be determined on the facts
of the particular case.37
The third element, that the harassment was based on sex, does not
raise a dispute in most heterosexual quid pro quo cases.38 However, in
some same-sex cases 39 and situations involving a bisexual supervisor, 40 it
is not always clear that the harassment was based on sex, and therefore,
same-sex claims under Title VII are not always recognized.4 1
Ordinarily, to determine whether the harassment was based on sex,
courts look at whether the victim would have been harassed "but for"
being a member of a certain sex. 42 For example, if a male aims conduct
at a female that he would not direct at a male, the conduct is because of
her sex. Thus, the claim is actionable because "but for" the victim's
sex, she would not have been harassed. However, sexual conduct that is
equally offensive to both male and female workers would not necessarily
constitute a Title VII violation because both sexes were treated alike.4 3
The fourth element requires that the employee's submission to the
unwelcome advances was a condition for receiving job benefits or the
employee's refusals to submit resulted in a tangible job detriment.44 It
appears from its plain language that a victim must show a tangible job
detriment to prove this element. 45 However, it has been held that an
36. Id.; see Henson, 682 F.2d at 903 (using two independent tests to determine whether the
conduct is unwelcome). First, the employee must not encourage or solicit the behavior; and second.
the employee must find the conduct offensive or undesirable. Henson, 682 F.2d at 903.
37. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (citing EEOC guideline's requirement of reviewing the record as a
whole and the totality of the circumstances).
38. See Raskin, supra note 29 at 146.
39. See. e.g., Myers v. City of El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tx. 1995) (holding that
sexual advances of a supervisor of the same-sex fails to establish a claim under Title VII).
40. See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1041 (1987) (stating that conduct that is equally offensive to both males and females does not violate
Title VII); Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934. 942 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that only in the absurd
situation of a bisexual supervisor harassing both sexes would there fail to be sex discrimination based
on sex). Contra Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993) (finding
that harassment of both genders is not beyond the scope of Title VII).
41. See cases cited supra note 17.
42. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 942 n.7. Same-sex cases brought under quid pro quo harassment
generally find that the harassment was based on sex, reasoning that but for the victim's sex, they
would not have been harassed. See Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 541 (M.D. Ala.
1983), aff'd mem., 749 F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1984) (finding same-sex harassment is actionable under
Title VII); see also Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc. 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (N.D. Ill. 1981)
(holding same-sex harassment is based on sex). But see Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,
451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating a same-sex claim is not actionable in hostile work environment action).
Contra McCoy v. Johnson Controls World Serv., Inc.. 878 F. Supp. 229, 232 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (finding
that same-sex harassment for hostile work environment is actionable under Title VII).
43. Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897. 904 (11th Cir.
1982)).
44. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,909 (11 th Cir. 1982).
45. Id. Tangible benefits include such things as raises, promotions, or other benefits. Janet
Hughie Smith & Rick Thaler, Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: Some Guidelines for Employers
and Legal Update, C983 A.L.I. A.B.A. 135.139-40 (1995).
1996]
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employee who has not lost material job benefits may still bring a quid
pro quo claim.4 6
The fifth element is the existence of employer liability.4 7 Generally
a standard of strict liability has been applied in cases of quid pro quo
harassment.4 8 Both EEOC guidelines 49 and caselaw support imposing'
strict liability on employers for sexual harassment committed by their
supervisory employees in quid pro quo cases.5 0
2. Hostile or Abusive Work Environment
In a claim for a hostile or abusive work environment, a plaintiff
must show five elements to establish a prima facie case: (1) the employ-
ee belongs to a protected class; (2) the employee was subjected to
unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct
of a sexual nature; (3) the harassment was based on sex; (4) the harass-
ment had the effect of unreasonably altering the victim's work perfor-
mance creating an abusive working environment; and (5) employer
liability. 5'
The first three elements are the same as those for quid pro quo
harassment. 52  The fourth element differs as it requires that a defen-
dant's conduct be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions
of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment. 53 The standard used to determine the fourth element is two part:
first, a reasonable person would find the environment objectively hostile
or abusive; and second, the victim must subjectively believe that the
environment is abusive.54
This standard was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.5 5 In Harris, the Court stated that a
discriminatory or abusive work environment was one which detracts
from an employee's job performance, discourages an employee from
staying on the job, or keeps them from advancing in their career.5 6 The
46. Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773. 778-79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2693
(1994).
47. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909.
48. Raskin. supra note 29, at 147-48 (citations omitted).
49. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c) (1995).
50. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909; Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934,947 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing EEOC
Guidelines which state that an employer is responsible for discriminatory acts of its agents and
supervisory employees regardless of whether the employer authorized or knew of the conduct).
51. Smith & Thaler, supra, note 45, at 141-42.
52. Henson, 682 F.2d at 909; see also supra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the
similarities of quid pro quo and hostile work environment elements).
53. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
54. Id.
55. 114 S. Ct. 367,370 (1993).
56. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370-71 (1993).
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Court in Harris stated that determining whether conduct is severe or
hostile cannot be found by using a mathematically precise test, but can
only be determined by looking at all of the circumstances. 57
The fifth element of a hostile work environment claim is the em-
ployer's liability. 58 Unlike quid pro quo harassment claims, where an
employer is strictly liable, in Meritor, the Court suggested that in a hostile
environment case, employers are not automatically liable for sexual
harassment by their supervisors. 59 In effect, this eliminates strict liability
for employers in hostile work environment claims. 60 Nonetheless, the
Court agreed with the EEOC's interpretation that Congress intended for
the court to look to agency principles for guidance, and thus some
employer liability exists.6 1
In response to the ruling in Meritor, where the Court declined to
define employer liability in a hostile environment claim, the Sixth Circuit
created a test to. determine employer liability. 62 The test requires that a
plaintiff prove that the employer, through its agents or supervisory
personnel, knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to
take prompt and appropriate corrective action. 63  The adequacy of the
employer's response to correct the alleged harassment must be evaluated
on a case by case basis.64
C. SAME-SEX HARASSMENT
The issue of whether same-sex harassment is actionable under Title
VII is generally brought before the court on a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim or by motion for summary judgment. 65 However,
cases have been tried in their entirety without the issue being considered
separately. 66 At issue in most same-sex sexual harassment cases is the
57. Id. at 371 (listing criteria to be considered, including: frequency of the conduct and its
severity; whether it is physically threatening, humiliating, or unreasonably interferes with work
performance; and the effect on the employee's psychological well-being).
58. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 909 (1 th Cir. 1982).
59. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (relying on EEOC Guidelines which
suggest that in a hostile environment claim, the basis for finding agency disappears if a victim does not
take advantage of procedures set to protect them, and if the employer has no knowledge of the
harassment, the employer should be shielded from liability).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.. 805 F.2d 611. 621 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied. 481 U.S.
1041-42 (1987).
63. Id. (citing Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1984)) (other citations
omitted).
64. Id. (referring to Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 726 F.2d 424.427 (8th Cir. 1984)).
65. See, e.g., Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv.. Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 307 (N.D. III. 1981)
(moving to dismiss): Polly v. Houston Lighting & Power Co., 803 F. Supp. 1. 3 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(moving for summary judgment).
66. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 538 (M.D. Ala. 1983), aff d mem., 749
19961 403
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third element under either quid pro quo or hostile or abusive harassment,
which requires the plaintiff to prove that the harassment was based on
sex.67 Courts often use the EEOC's guidelines as an aid in making
determinations. 68 The EEOC guidelines specifically state that sexual
harassment is a violation of Title VII.69 The EEOC's position is that the
victim need not be of the opposite sex from the harasser to be actionable,
but rather, the court should determine whether the harasser treats a
member or members of one sex differently from members of the other
sex.70
Same-sex sexual harassment was initially recognized7' as actionable
under Title VII in 1981 in Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc.72 In
Wright, a male employee was subjected to quid pro quo harassment and
dismissed for rejecting the homosexual advances of his supervisor. 73 In
Wright, the court relied on dicta of two circuit court cases and held that a
case of same-sex harassment states a claim under Title VII. 74 The court
in Wright concluded that the legal problem is the same for a person
harassed by a homosexual supervisor as it is for a person harassed by a
heterosexual supervisor of the opposite sex.75
F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1984).
67. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co.. 63 U.S.L.W. 2772 (E.D. La. Apr. 25 1995)
(Civ.A.No. 93-2351) (stating the third element is crucial in same-sex cases); see also Raskin. supra
note 29. at 151 (stating that it appears that the issue of gender arises more in the context of hostile or
abusive harassment rather than quid pro quo).
68. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (referring to the EEOC guidelines as "a
body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance") (citations omitted). The EEOC has been empowered to prevent employment practices
which violate Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1988). To facilitate this responsibility, the EEOC has
issued "Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex," which require reviewing the totality of the
circumstances to determine whether sexual harassment exists. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604, 1604.11 (1995).
69. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (a). The guidelines state that sexual harassment exists when unwelcome
sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other conduct of a sexual nature requires submission to
or is made a condition of employment or when submission or rejection of such conduct is used as the
basis for employment decisions, or unreasonably interferes with the individual's work performance.
Id. Sexual conduct which creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment is also
considered harassment. Id.
70. Waag v. Thomas Pontiac, Buick, GMC, Inc., No. Civ. 3-95-538, 1996 WL 179860 at *6 (D.
Minn. Apr. 12, 1996) (citing EEOC Compl. Man. § 615, 2(b)).
71. See Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (N.D. I11. 1981) (stating
that neither of the parties, nor the court had been able to locate any direct precedent for a same-sex
claim under Title VII). See also Barlow v. Northwestern Memorial Hosp., 30 Fair Emp. Prac. Cases
223, 224 NO. 79C4474 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 1980) (allowing a claim for race and sex discrimination of a
female by a female supervisor).
72. 511 F. Supp. 307 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
73. Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv., Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 309-10 (N.D. I11. 1981).
74. Id. at 310 (citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d
983 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
75. Id. (relying on language from Barnes, 561 F.2d at 990 n.55).
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Subsequently, in 1983, in Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation 76
another quid pro quo claim of same-sex harassment was recognized.
77
In Joyner, a male employee was asked to engage in homosexual activities
by the manager, and was later discharged for refusing. 7 8 The court in
Joyner relied in part on Wright, but also went through an analysis of the
elements of a prima facie case for quid pro quo harassment, and found
the complainant had met every element. 79 The rationale for recognizing
quid pro quo claims in both Joyner and Wright, was that the gender of
the supervisor is not relevant when a supervisor demands sexual favors of
an employee in exchange for advancement.
8 0
However, not all federal courts have accepted same-sex claims.
Contrary to earlier cases, in 1988, in Goluszek v. Smith,8 1 the court found
that the complainant did not state a cognizable claim of sexual harass-
ment and held that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title
VII.82 In Goluszek, the male victim was subjected to teasing of a sexual
nature by male co-workers.83 The plaintiff filed a hostile work environ-
ment claim. 84 The court in Goluszek reasoned that Congress did not
intend to prohibit same-sex harassment, but was concerned only with
correcting discrimination created by an imbalance of power used against
discrete and vulnerable groups.8 5 In its analysis, the court stated that
even though Goluszek may have been harassed because he was male, the
harassment did not create an anti-male environment, which was deemed
by the court to be a requirement to a Title VII claim.8 6
In 1994, the Fifth Circuit, in Garcia v. Elf Atochem North America,8 7
directly addressed this issue88 and, following Goluszek, determined that
76. 597 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd mem., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984).
77. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transp., 597 F. Supp. 537, 542 (M.D. Ala. 1983), affd mem., 749
F.2d 732 (11 th Cir. 1984).
78. Id. at 538-40.
79. Id. at 541-42.
80. Prescott v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1550-51 (M.D. Ala.
1995) (citing Joyner, 597 F. Supp. at 542: Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv.. Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307, 3 10
(N.D. Ill. 1981)).
81. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. Il. 1988).
82. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Il. 1988) (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611,623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
83. Id. at 1453.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1456. However, this finding was based on an academic commentary, not on the
legislative record. Id. (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under
Title VI1,97 HARV, L. REv. 1449,1451-52 (1984)),
86. Id. at 1456 (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J..
dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
87. 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994).
88. Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Mayo v. Kiwest Corp.,
898 F. Supp. 335, 337 (E.D. Va. 1995) (stating that the Fifth Circuit is the only circuit to directly
address the issue as of August, 1995). In January 1996, the Fourth Circuit also ruled on this issue.
4051996]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
same-sex harassment is not actionable. 89 In Garcia, a male employee
alleged sexual harassment by a male plant foreman (but not the victim's
supervisor) who on several occasions grabbed Garcia's crotch and made
sexual motions from behind. 90 When Mr. Garcia reported the conduct,
the foreman was reprimanded and warned that he would be terminated if
the conduct continued. 9 1 Like Goluszek, Garcia was a hostile work
environment case as there were no sexual demands made.92
In Garcia, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that the complainant failed to
satisfy the prima facie element of employer liability. 93 The court
supported its opinion by quoting a holding in an unpublished opinion 94
that "'[h]arassment by a male supervisor against a male subordinate
does not state a claim under Title VII even though the harassment has
sexual overtones.'"95
The weight of authority of Garcia96 has been disputed. Some
courts find the comments on same-sex harassment as a holding,97 while
other authorities refer to these comments as dicta.98 Regardless, many
courts have relied heavily on both Goluszek and Garcia when ruling that
same-sex harassment is not actionable. 99 For example, in January, 1996,
the Fourth Circuit, in McWilliams v. Fairfax County Board of Supervi-
McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1195 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that
same-sex hostile environment cases where both the harassers and victim are heterosexual fail to state
a claim for sexual harassment).
89. Garcia, 28 F.3d at 448.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 448-49 (describing the work environment of Garcia).
93. Id. at 451 (affirming the judgment of the district court and stating the employer can only be
held liable if he knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial
action reasonably calculated to end the harassment).
94. Garcia. 28 F.3d at 451 (citing Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6. 1993)
(unpublished)).
95. id. (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6, 1993) (unpublished)).
96. Id. at 446.
97. Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp. 521, 525 (D.S.C. 1995) (stating that Garcia found
harassment by male supervisor against male subordinate was not cognizable under Title VII); EEOC
v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp. 1100, 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (stating that Garcia adopted the
holding that same-sex harassment is not cognizable under Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Serv., Inc., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 769 No.Civ.A. 94-1483 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1995) aff'd,
No. 95-30510. 1996 WL 223627 (5th Cir. May 20, 1996) (disagreeing with the plaintiff's argument
that Garcia's holding was merely dicta); Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas & Elec., 871 F. Supp. 822, 833 (D.
Md. 1994) aff'd on other grounds. 77 F.3d 745 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding that Garcia flatly held that
sexual harassment by the same gender does not state a claim under Title VII).
98. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2772 (E.D. La. Apr. 25, 1995)
(CivA.No. 93-2351) (concluding that Garcia with minimal explanation, has stated in dicta that Title
VII is inapplicable to instances of same-sex harassment); see also Raskin. supra note 29. at 153
(referring to Garcia opinion as dicta).
99. See. e.g., Hopkins. 871 F. Supp. at 833-34 (stating Garcia is the only reported appellate
opinion to directly address same-sex harassment and referring to Goluszek as the basis of the Garcia
decision); see also Myers v. City of El Paso. 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tex. 1995) (stating that the




sors,100 relied on Garcia to hold in a same-sex hostile work environment
case that no claim existed under title VII.101
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The sole issue determined in Walden Book was whether same-sex
harassment is actionable under Title VII.102 The issue came before the
court prior to trial on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.103 This
was a case of first impression for federal district courts in the Sixth
Circuit. 104
The Walden court produced several reasons to sustain a claim under
Title VII.105 Of significance was the court's determination that the legal
basis for same-sex discrimination is consistent with male on female
sexual discrimination. 106 In determining that the concept of sexual
harassment is not limited to opposite sex discrimination, the court cited
the Supreme Court's analysis in Meritor, stating "when a supervisor
sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor 'discriminates' on the basis of sex."107
Also relevant in the Walden court's analysis was the court's recog-
nition of cases of reverse discrimination.108 Since reverse discrimination
has been recognized, the court reasoned that discrimination against the
majority is actionable; and as such, it would be unfair not to recognize a
same-sex claim. 109
Finally, in finding that a same-sex claim is actionable, the court in
Walden relied on McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,l 0 in which the
Supreme Court implied that Title VII applies in varying discrimination
contexts by instructing courts to modify the standard for establishing a
prima facie case to accommodate differing discrimination contexts.111
Although the court in Walden recognized that some courts had
found that same-sex harassment was not actionable under Title VII, it
found the reasoning of these courts to be illogical.112 The Walden court
100. 72 F.3d 1191 (4th Cir. 1996).
101. McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors, 72 F.3d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1996).
102. EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F.Supp 1100. 1101 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
103. Id. at 1100.
104. Id. at 1101.
105. Id.
106. Id. (citing Wright v. Methodist Youth Serv.. Inc., 511 F. Supp. 307,310 (N.D. Ill. 1981)).
107. Walden, 885 F. Supp at 1102 (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57.63 (1986)).
108. Id. at 1103 (citations omitted).
109. Id. (citations omitted).
110. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
111. Walden, 885 F. Supp. at 1103 (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,802
n.13 (1973)).
112. Id. at 1102-03. One reason another court had for not recognizing the claim was that Title
VII was meant to prohibit an atmosphere of oppression by a dominant gender, therefore a male in a
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stated the plain meaning of Title VII's phrase prohibiting discrimination
based on sex "implies that it is unlawful to discriminate against women
because they are women and against men because they are men."1 13
Accordingly, the court reasoned that when a homosexual supervisor
makes offensive sexual advances to a subordinate of the same sex, and
not to employees of the opposite sex, it is certainly a situation where,
"but for" the subordinate's sex, he or she would not have been subject-
ed to that treatment.114 Thus the court in Walden found that same-sex
sexual harassment was actionable under Title VII.115
IV. IMPACT
Through 1995 district courts continue to be split on the issue of
whether same-sex sexual harassment is a violation of Title VII.116 The
trend emerging appears to be that many courts are recognizing quid pro
quo claims, but failing to recognize hostile environment claims.117 The
rationale for this split appears to be based on two policies. The recogni-
tion of quid pro quo stems from the idea that it would be absurd to
exempt homosexuals from the laws which would punish heterosexuals
for the same conduct. 118
Alternatively, courts are finding it difficult to recognize hostile
environment claims arguing that it is not the type of conduct Congress
intended to sanction when enacting Title VII.119 Courts in this vein,
adopt the Goluszek rationale, finding that Congress was only concerned
with discrimination stemming from an imbalance and abuse of power
used against a discrete and vulnerable group.120 Consequently, these
courts deduce that it is necessary for a male to prove an anti-male
male dominated workplace would not be protected. Id. (citing Goluszek v. Smith. 697 F. Supp. 1452.
1456 (N.D. I1. 1988)).
113. Id. at 1103.
114. Id. at 1104.
115. Id.
116. Elizabeth Pryor Johnson & Michael A. Puchades, Same Gender Sexual Harassment: But is
it Discrimination Based on Sex?, 69 FLA. B J. 79, 80-81 (1995).
117. See, e.g.. Prescott v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 1545, 1545 (M.D. Ala. 1995)
(recognizing a quid pro quo same-sex harassment claim). Contra Benekritis v. Johnson, 882 F. Supp.
521.525-26 (D.S.C. 1995) (failing to recognize a same-sex hostile environment claim).
118. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2772 (E.D. La. Apr. 25,
1995) (Civ.A.No. 93-2351).
119. See Mayo v. Kiwest Corp., 898 F. Supp. 335. 337-38 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that same sex
discrimination is not actionable under Title VII); Ashworth v. Roundup Co., 897 F. Supp. 489,491-94
(W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding that same sex harassment by supervisor was not actionable under Title
VII): Benekritis, 882 F. Supp. at 525-26 (failing to recognize a same gender hostile environment claim
under Title VII); Myers v. El Paso, 874 F. Supp. 1546, 1548 (W.D. Tx. 1995) (holding that female
employee failed to establish Title VII claim because employer was of the same gender).
120. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (citing Note, Sexual Harassment
Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1449. 1451-52 (1984)).
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working environment. 121 Of interest, is that under this analysis virtually
no one in an environment dominated by a persons of the same-sex could
ever prove a hostile work environment claim.122
The Walden decision follows the recent trend, complimenting and
expanding the reasons for recognizing quid pro quo sexual harassment.
Yet, unlike other holdings in same-sex litigation, the Walden court's
opinion has special significance. Rather than relying on decisions based
on unpublished opinions as the Fifth Circuit did in Garcia,123 or twisting
a dissenting circuit court decision' 24 as the court in Goluszek did,125 the
decision in Walden is based on principles of law defining sexual harass-
ment which have been recognized by the Supreme Court.1 26 Moreover,
the court's analogy of comparing same-sex harassment to reverse
discrimination actions contributes common sense and logic to ordinarily
"legal-based" opinions, demonstrating that it would be unjustifiable to
allow reverse discrimination cases but not same-sex sexual harassment
cases under Title VII.127
Although Walden is a lower court opinion, only five circuit courts
have dealt with the issue, and these courts are split. 128 Consequently, the
numerous district court opinions on the topic play a strong role in
determining the future of same-sex claims and Walden thus has the
potential to have a significant impact on future decisions.
Walden has already had an impact on several lower courts. One
court reconsidered its view that same-sex harassment is not actionable,
stating that there have been material changes or refinements in the law,129
121. Id. (citing Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 623 (6th Cir. 1986), (Keith, J.
dissenting), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
122. Id.
123. Id. (citing Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 92-8533 (5th Cir. Dec. 6. 1993) (unpublished)).
124. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co.. 805 F.2d 611. 623-28 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, dissenting
opinion). cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987)).
125. Goluszek v. Smith, 697 F. Supp. 1452, 1456 (N.D. I1l. 1988).
126. EEOC v. Walden Book Co., 885 F. Supp 1100. 1100-01, 1103 (M.D. Tenn. 1995) (following
Harris v. Forklift Sys.. Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367,370-71 (1993)); Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson. 477 U.S. 57.
63 (1986); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 n.13 (1973)).
127. Id. at 1103.
128. See Baskerville v. Culligan Int'l. Co., 50 F.3d 428, 430 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating in dicta that
sexual harassment by persons of the same sex may be actionable in appropriate cases); Bundy v.
Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 942-43 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating in dicta that sexual harassment may be
gender discrimination when a homosexual supervisor harasses an employee of the same gender). But
see McWilliams v. Fairfax County Bd. of Supervisors. 72 F.3d 1191, 1195-96 (4th Cir. 1996) (refusing
to recognize a same-sex hostile environment claim where both alleged harassers and victim were
heterosexual); Garcia v. Elf Atochem N. Am., 28 F.3d 446,451-52 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding same-sex
sexual harassment in a hostile environment case not actionable); Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp.,
901 F.2d 186, 192-94 (1st Cir. 1990) (reviewing facts in a same-sex hostile environment claim which
failed to rise to the level of harassment to be actionable under Title VII).
129. See Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 887 F. Supp. 1178, 1179-81 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(suggesting that previously, in Vandeventer v. Wabash Nat'l Corp., 867 F. Supp. 790, 796 (N.D. Ind.
1994), the judge's earlier ruling that same-sex harassment is not actionable under Title VII may have
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and others have chosen to cite Walden as the rationale for recognizing a
claim. 130 These decisions are important as they give courts new ideas
and alternative views to circuit decisions. 131
Therefore, the Walden court's decision to find same-sex sexual
harassment actionable under Title VII is significant for two reasons.
Alone, it offers a new way of analyzing same-sex cases, and as one of
many district court opinions, the decision acts as another brick in the
growing wall of cases which recognize that same-sex harassment is a
violation of an employee's civil rights.
Lisa Fair McEvers
been overbroad).
130. Raney v. District of Columbia, 892 F. Supp. 283, 287 (D.D.C. 1995); Ecklund v. Fuisz
Technology, Ltd., 905 F. Supp. 335, 338 (E.D. Va. 1995); Sardinia v. Dellwood Foods, Inc., 64
U.S.L.W. 2329 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 1995) (No. 94 Civ. 5458); Williams v. District of Columbia, 916 F.
Supp. 1,9 (D.D.C. 1996).
131. Pritchett v. Sizeler Real Estate Management Co., 63 U.S.L.W. 2772 (E.D. La. Apr. 25,
1995) (Civ.A.No. 93-2351) (refusing to follow the Garcia Circuit Court decision, and has held that
same-sex harassment should be actionable).
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